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Proof of a Defendant's Knowledge that His
Conduct is a Crime and the Federal

Monetary Transaction Reporting
Requirements after Ratzlaf
Thomas M. DiBiagio*
I. Introduction
Criminal conduct is typically driven by the desire for celebrity status
in our culture of violence and avarice. Crimes driven by the desire for
enrichment from pernicious commerce, whether it be drug trafficking,
kidnapping, fraud or espionage, generate billiolis of dollars in illicit
proceeds.' But this criminal conduct can be exposed by the same wealth
it creates. 2 More particularly, this type of crime is betrayed by spending,
possessing, depositing, or transferring large amounts of cash and
monetary instruments. In order to detect the use and movement of
criminal proceeds, federal law requires financial institutions and
individuals to file reports describing certain international and domestic
financial transactions.
The primary reporting requirements for such transactions are set
forth in Sections 5313 and 5316 of Title 31.? Section 5313 requires
banks and other financial institutions to file a report with the Internal
Revenue Service on virtually every cash transaction involving $10,000 or
more. 4 Section 5316 requires individuals to report the international
transfer of monetary instruments into or out of the United States in

*Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Maryland. The views and opinions expressed
in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect those of the Department of Justice.
1. See CaliforniaBeing Enriched by Undergroundand Illegal Money, N.Y. TIMES, April 10,
1994, at A17 ("Nationally, estimates of laundered cash run as high as $100 billion. In the late 1980's
Colombia's Medellin cocaine cartel used Los Angeles jewelry stores to hide drug cash. Now
investigators say money exchange houses along the Mexican border are performing a similar task.");
Lawrence Van Gelder, 33 Are Chargedas DrugGang Members, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 10, 1994, at B23
(reporting that 33 were charged in $350,000-a-week crack cocaine operation).
2. See Tim Weiner, Spy's Spending BroughtAlarm But No Action, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1994,
at AI (convicted spy's spending of $600,000 over a several month period from unknown source
alerted CIA official of potential danger but no action was taken); Bill Miller and Walter Pincus, CIA
Knew OfAmes's Wealth, FBI Says, WASH. POST, March 11, 1994, at Al (explaining that the CIA
should have given espionage suspect a serious look when it discovered $540,000 cash payment for
house in Virginia years before arrest by FBI).
3. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq. (1983 & 1994 Supp.).
4. 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1983 & 1994 Supp.); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1993).
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amounts in excess of $10,000.5 In conjunction with these reporting
requirements, Section 5324 prohibits the "structuring" or, in other words,
the breaking down of a single domestic cash transaction or international
monetary transaction above the reporting threshold into two or more
separate transactions for the purpose of evading the reporting
requirements of Section 5313 or 5316.6 The criminal penalties provision
applicable to Section 5313 and 5316, as well as the balance of the other
reporting provisions, is set forth in Section 5322. 7 This section declares
that a "willful violation" of any of the reporting obligations is a federal
crime.
In order to prove that there has been a criminal violation of Section
5324, the courts of appeals had uniformly held that the government was
required to prove the following two elements: that the defendants knew
of the reporting requirement and that the defendants intended to evade the
law. 8 In addition, because Section 5322 refers to "willful violations,"
one circuit had held that the government was also required to prove that
the defendants knew that evading the reporting requirement was a crime
or that they acted in reckless disregard of knowing that the conduct was
a crime before their acts would be considered a willful violation. 9 Ten
circuits, however, have held that this knowledge requirement was not an
element of the offense." The question of what proof is actually needed
to sustain a structuring conviction was recently answered and settled by
the United States Supreme Court. In Ratzlaf v. United States," a
divided Court held that the prosecution must prove that the defendants
knew that evading the reporting requirement was a crime before the
defendants' acts will be considered a willful violation under Section
5324.12

5. 31 U.S.C. Section 5316 (1983 & 1994 Supp.); 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (1993).
6. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994 Supp.); 31 C.F.R.. § 103.53 (1993).
7. 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1994 Supp.); 31 C.F.R. § 103.49 (1993).
8. United States v. Pitner, 937 F.2d 156, 159-60 (9th Cir.), vacated, 127 L.Ed 70 (1994);
United States v. Shirk, 981 F.2d 1382, 1389-90 (3d Cir.), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 873 (1994); United
States v. Baydoun, 984 F.2d 175, 180 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 76768 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 91, 93-94 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Brown, 954 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 284 (1992); United States v.
Gibbons, 968 F.2d 639, 644 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rogers, 962 F.2d 342, 344-45 (4th Cir.
1992); United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532, 537-40 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 402
(1991); United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 489-92, (2d Cir. 1990).
9. United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 498 (1st Cir.), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 873 (1994).
10. Supra note 8.
11. _ U.S. __ 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
12. Id. at 657-59.

CRIMINAL CONDUCT UNDER RATZLAF

The Court's decision makes it clear that a criminal violation of not
only Section 5324, but also of any of the reporting provisions, requires
the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew that evading the federal
reporting requirement was a crime. As a result, the Court has
unnecessarily burdened the government with proving facts that go beyond
showing that the defendant knowingly and intentionally committed a
crime. The Court has chosen to state a remarkable departure from
established criminal law in a case where neither the facts of the case nor
the statute compelled such a parting from the venerable criminal law
doctrine that knowledge of illegality is not an element of a crime. The
extent to which the decision will act to throttle reporting provision
prosecutions may be mitigated by the Court's recognition that
circumstantial evidence may be used to prove each element of the
offense, including knowledge of illegality. Moreover, of significant note,
the utility purpose of the reporting requirements, to betray criminal
conduct, has not been impeached by the Court's strict knowledge
requirement. The reports required to be filed under the statutory scheme
should remain an effective investigative resource. In the context of the
federal money laundering statute, although an intent to evade the
reporting requirements is designated as one of the specific intent
provisions in the federal money laundering statute, the Court's decision
does not appear to alter the government's burden of proving that a
defendant laundered criminal proceeds with the intent to evade the
reporting requirements. 3
II. Federal Transaction Reporting Requirements
Congress enacted the federal reporting requirements to deter the use
of banks and other financial institutions as a means of integrating
criminal proceeds into the economy.'4 Title 31 of the United States
Code contains two principal reporting provisions. These provisions
impose a variety of reporting requirements on individuals and institutions
involved in international transfers and domestic monetary transactions.
These reporting requirements are intended to expose criminal conduct and
are based upon the belief that the deposit or international transfer of large
amounts of money may betray criminal activity.

13. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988 & 1992 Supp.). This article will discuss the Federal Transaction
Reporting Requirements, the decisions of the Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court's decision in
Ratzlaf and an evaluation of the Court's reasoning.
14. 114 S. Ct. at 661 n.1 I (holding that the purpose of reporting provisions is to provide law
enforcement additional investigative tools to detect financial crimes such as money laundering).
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A. Domestic Currency Transactions
Title 31 of the United States Code Section 5313 requires that a
financial institution file a report on all domestic cash transactions 5 in
excess of $10,000.16 A financial institution includes any bank, securities
firm, casino, currency exchange broker, check cashier, travel agency,
insurance company, wire transmittal business, automobile dealership, and
real estate agent. 7 The report required to be filed is known as a
"Currency Transaction Report" ("CTR"). This report must be filed with
the Internal Revenue Service within fifteen days of the cash transaction,
which includes both a deposit or withdraw of cash in excess of
$10,000.8 The CTR reflects information regarding the identity of the
individual who conducted the transaction and on whose behalf the
transaction was conducted, the type of transaction, and location of where
the transaction took place.
B. InternationalMonetary Transactions
Section 5316 requires individuals to report the international transfer
of monetary instruments 9 into or out of the United States in amounts
in excess of $10,000.20 The report to be filed is known as a Report of
International Transportation Currency or Monetary Instruments
("CMIR"). 2' This report is required to be filed within fifteen days of
sending or receiving the funds and must include the following

15. A "transaction" under the reporting provisions would include any deposit, withdraw,
exchange of currency, or any other payment or transfer in cash in an amount more than $10,000. 31
U.S.C. § 5312 (1983); 31 C.F.R. § 103.21(a)(1) (1993).
16. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1983 & 1994 Supp.); 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.22(a)(1), 103.27(4) (1993).
There are a few designated exempted transactions. For example, the statute does not require reports
for cash deposits or withdrawals for an existing account by an established depositor operating a retail
business, sports area, race track, amusement park, bar, restaurant, hotel, licensed check cashing
service, vending machine company, theater, regularly scheduled passenger carrier or public utility.
31 C.F.R. §§ 103.22(4)(b)(2)(i), (ii) (1993).
17. 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(i) (1993).
18. 31 C.F.R. § 103.27 (1993).
19. Monetary instruments are defined as including United States and foreign currency, bank
checks, travelers' checks, negotiable instruments, and investment securities. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(3)
(1983); 31 C.F.R. § 103.11 (m) (1993).
20. 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (1983); 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1993). The provision requires the filing of
reports when "a person or an agent or bailee of the person... knowingly (1) transports, is about to
transport, or has transported, monetary instruments of more than $10,000 at one time" into, or out
of, the United States. See generally United States v. Goulding, 26 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
that the defendant was convicted of violating Section 5316).
21. The other international transaction reporting provision is Section 5314. This section governs
records and reports on foreign financial agency transactions. This law requires any person who has
an interest in or signature over a foreign bank account to file a report. 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (1988); 31
C.F.R. § 103.24 (1993).

CRIMINAL CONDUCT UNDER RATZLAF

information: the identity of the amount transmitted, the origin and
destination of the money, the ownership of the funds, and the identity of
the individual transporting the funds.22
C. Structuring
Section 532423 is the companion provision to Sections 5313 and
5316. Section 5324 prohibits the "structuring" or breaking down of a
domestic cash transaction or international monetary transaction for the
purpose of evading or attempting to evade the reporting requirement of
Section 5313 or 5316.24 A CTR is required to be filed by the financial
institution if there is even a suspicion that an individual is structuring his
deposits or withdraws to avoid the reporting requirement.25
With respect to Section 5313, domestic cash transactions are
typically structured in one of two ways. First, a drug dealer, for
example, who wants to deposit $20,000 into the bank will first break
down or divide the cash by purchasing cashier checks, money orders, or
other monetary instruments in amounts less than $10,000 in order to
avoid triggering any reporting requirements. The ultimate deposit is,
thus, a combination of cash in an amount less than $10,000 and these
other monetary instruments. Second, in a scheme commonly referred to
as "smurfing," a drug dealer, for example, breaks down his cash into
smaller cash increments under $10,000 and then deposits these smaller
amounts at different financial institutions or different branches of the
same financial institution on the same day or spread out over a two or
three day period.26

22. Unlike Section 5313 which addresses only cash or currency transactions, Section 5316
addresses the transportation of monetary instruments. See supra note 18.
23. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994 Supp.).
24. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994 Supp.); 31 C.F.R. § 103.53 (1993). See United States v. Paul, 23
F.3d 365, 367-68 (11 th Cir. 1994) (holding that the purpose of Section 5324 is to prevent individuals
from causing banks to fail to file required reports or defeating government's efforts to identify large
cash transactions by splitting up large cash transaction in a manner that avoids triggering reporting
requirement).
25. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (1983 & 1994 Supp.). On September 13, 1994, The New York Times
reported on a case of suspects charged in a $40 million food stamp fraud and money laundering
scheme of engaging in structuring cash withdrawals in order to avoid detection. See Ralph
Blumenthal, 30 Accused Of Cashing Food Stamps Held in Laundering Over $40 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at B3.
26. 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(p) (1993). Structuring is not confined to cash transactions involving
a bank. For example, drug dealers typically attempt to avoid any paper trail in connection with their
purchase of expensive luxury cars. To this end, a drug dealer will either purchase the car in the
name of a nominee or structure the cash purchase by first engaging in a sham purchase of a car with
a sale price of less than $10,000. For example, the individual would pay $9,000 for the car and then
return to the dealership the next day and "trade-up." This time, cash in an amount less than $10,000
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D. CriminalPenalties
To enforce this statutory scheme, Congress created criminal penalties
for evading the reporting requirements. The criminal enforcement
provision applicable to Section 5313, 5316, and 5324 violations is set
forth in Section 5322.27 This section sets out the penalties for any
person "willfully violating" any of the reporting provisions and the
antistructuring provision of Section 5324.2" In order to prove a criminal
violation of the reporting requirements under Section 5322, the courts
have uniformly held that the government is required to prove the
following two elements: that the defendants knew of the reporting
requirement and that the defendants structured their cash transactions with
the intent to avoid the reporting requirement.29 In addition, one court
of appeals had held that the government was required to prove that the
defendants knew it was a crime to evade the reporting requirement or
acted in reckless disregard of knowing that their onduct was a crime.30
This additional requirement created a conflict among the circuits, which
the Supreme Court has recently put to rest.
III. Ratzlaf v. United States
A. Background
On October 20, 1988, Waldemar Ratzlaf, gambling on a line of
credit, incurred a debt of $160,000 playing blackjack at the High Sierra
Casino in Reno, Nevada. The casino gave him one week to pay his
gambling debt. The next week, Ratzlaf returned to the casino with

would be combined with the "trade-in" vehicle to reach the purchase price. As a result, a report to
the government linking the drug dealer to a large cash transaction is avoided. See also United States
v. McLamb, 985 F.2d 1284, 1286-88 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding the defendant guilty of structuring
based on sale of car).
27. 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1994 Supp.); 31 C.F.R § 103.49 (1993).
28. Id. Section 5322 provides in pertinent part that: "A person willfully violating this
subchapter or a regulation prescribed under this subchapter . . . shall be fined not more than
$250,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both." 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994 Supp.).
29. United States v. Pitner, 937 F.2d 156, 159-60 (9th Cir.), vacated, 127 L.Ed 70 (1994);
United States v. Shirk, 981 F.2d 1382, 1389-90 (3d Cir.), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 873 (1994); United
States v. Baydoun, 984 F.2d 175, 180 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 76768 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 91, 93-94 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Brown, 954 F.2d 1563, 1568 (lith Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 284 (1992); United States v.
Gibbons, 968 F.2d 639, 644 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rogers, 962 F.2d 342, 344-45 (4th Cir.
1992); United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532, 537-40 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 402
(1991); United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 489-92, (2d Cir. 1990).
30. United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 498 (1st Cir.), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 873 (1994).

CRIMINAL CONDUCT UNDER RATZLAF

$100,000 in cash. When he went to make the payment, Ratzlaf was told
that the casino was required to file a report with the government on all
transactions involving more than $10,000 in cash. 3' Ratzlaf told the
casino that he did not want the casino to file a report.32 The casino
refused to accept the cash payment on those terms. The casino official
advised Ratzlaf that the casino would accept a cashier's check for the full
amount due without triggering any reporting requirements to the
government.
The casino then had Ratzlaf driven to banks around Stateline,
Nevada and South Lake Tahoe, California for the purpose of buying
cashier checks. 34 At the first bank, Ratzlaf was again told of the
reporting requirement. Ratzlaf proceeded to structure his purchases by
visiting several banks and limiting his purchases to separate checks all in
an amount less than $10,000. At one bank, Ratzlaf attempted to buy two
$9,500 cashier's checks. When he was told that a report would have to
be filed, he cancelled the purchases. Ratzlaf eventually returned to the
casino and made a partial payment of $76,000 in cashier's checks. 5
After making the partial payment, Ratzlaf returned to his home in
Portland, Oregon. There, Ratzlaf engaged in a third scheme to evade the
reporting provision by giving cash to three individuals and directing them
to purchase cashier's checks for him. In addition, Ratzlaf and his wife
purchased five cashier's checks each in amounts less than $10,000 from
two Portland banks.36 After a sufficient amount of cashier's checks had
been purchased, Ratzlaf returned to the High Sierra Casino and paid off
37
the debt.

On November 20, 1990, Ratzlaf and his wife were indicted by a
federal grand jury and charged with conspiracy to structure and
structuring.38 At trial, Ratzlaf admitted that he was told of the reporting
requirements and structured the cash transactions with the intent to evade
the banks' reporting obligations.39 The district court instructed the jury
that the government had to prove that the defendant knew of the banks'
reporting obligations and that his purchases were intended to evade the

31.

Ratzlaf 114 S. Ct. at 663; United States v. Ratzlaf, 976 F.2d 1280, 1281 (9th Cir. 1992),

rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).

32.

Ratzlaf 976 F.2d at 1281.

33.

Ratz1af, 114 S. Ct. at 657.

34.
35.
36.

Id. at 657, 664.
Id. at 657, 664.
Ratzlaf 976 F.2d at 1282.

37.

Ratz1af, 114 S. Ct. at 657.

38.
39.

Ratzlaf, 976 F.2d at 1282.
Ratziaf 114 S. Ct. at 659.
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reporting requirements.4 ° Ratzlaf's defense was that he was unaware that
structuring was a crime. The trial court rejected this assertion as a matter
of law and gave an affirmative instruction that the prosecution was not
required to prove that the defendant knew that structuring transactions to
evade the banks' filing requirements was a crime.4 1 Ratzlaf was
convicted of all charges and appealed.4 2
B. Ninth Circuit
On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court had misstated
the elements of the crime. Ratzlaf contended that to sustain a Section
5322 conviction, the government was required to prove that he knew that
structuring the transactions to evade the reporting requirement was a
crime.4 3 The Ninth Circuit followed the established precedent in that
circuit and upheld the trial court's affirmative instruction that the
government was not required to prove knowledge of illegality.44
C. Majority View of Circuit Court Decisions
The Supreme Court granted certiorari from the Ninth Circuit on
April 26, 1993.4" At that time, every circuit had considered whether the
prosecution was required to prove that a defendant knew that evading the
reporting requirement was a crime. Ten circuits held that a criminal
violation of Section 5324 could be established without proof that the
defendant knew that evading the reporting requirement was a crime.46
In addition, the Supreme Court had denied certiorari in two of these
47
cases.
The leading case which held that the prosecution was not required
to prove that a defendant knew that his conduct was a crime was United
States v. Scanio,4 In Scanio, the defendant was convicted of structuring
cash transactions in violation of Sections 5324 and 5322. On appeal, the
defendant contended that the government was required to prove that he
was "actually aware" that structuring was a crime. 49 The court found

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
United
48.
49.

Ratzlaf 114 S. Ct. at 657; Ratzlaf 976 F.2d at 1282.
Ratzlaf 976 F.2d at 1282.
Ratzlaf 114 S. Ct. at 657.
Ratziaf, 976 F.2d at 1284.
Id. at 1284-85.
Ratzlaf v United States, 113 S. Ct. 1942 (1993).
Supra note 8.
United States v. Brown, 954 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 284 (1992);
States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 402 (1991).
900 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1990).
Id.

CRIMINAL CONDUCT UNDER RATZLAF

that "[b]y its plain language" to sustain a conviction under Section
5324(3), the government was required to show that an individual
structured a currency transaction with the intent to evade the reporting
requirement. 5" The court then held that "[w]hile Section 5324(3) does
not specifically require proof that the defendant know that structuring is
unlawful, we must consider whether Section 5322(a), which provides
criminal penalties for willful violations of Section 5324, mandates that
there must be proof that the defendant was actually aware of the illegality
of structuring."'" The court rejected the defendant's interpretation of
what constitutes a "willful violation" and explained that:
[A] requirement that an act be done "willfully" normally does
not necessitate proof that the defendant was specifically aware of the
law penalizing his conduct. Where the law imposes criminal liability
for certain conduct, a requirement that the conduct be "willful"
generally "means no more than that the person charged with the duty
knows what he is doing. It does not mean that, in addition,he must
suppose that he is breaking the law. ' 2

The court found that by intentionally structuring his cash transactions
with the explicit purpose of evading a known legal duty, the defendant
had engaged in "affirmative conduct" that "demonstrated an awareness of
the legal framework," and that he should have been alerted that he was
breaking the law."
The Scanio decision was followed by nine other circuits.54 For

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 489.
Scanio, 900 F.2d at 490.
In United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 402 (1992),

the defendant won approximately $92,000 playing blackjack at a casino in Las Vegas, Nevada.
When the defendant visited his stock broker in order to invest the winnings, he was told that a CTR
was required to be filed for any cash deposit in excess of $10,000. Dashney, 937 F.2d at 533. He
then obtained a driver's license in another name from another state and then purchased eleven checks
from eight different banks all in an amount below $10,000. The defendant was convicted of
structuring and appealed. On appeal he contended that the prosecution was required to prove that
the defendant knew that structuring was a crime. The court found that, contrary to the defendant's
contention, the legislative history did not support any finding that knowledge of illegality was
required. The court recognized that in the context of a Section 5316 violation, courts have held that
knowledge of illegality was required. The court, however, distinguished these cases because, unlike
Section 5316, innocent or accidental structuring of transactions does not trigger the statute. The court
found that the defendant had gone to great lengths to avoid the filing of a CTR on his money and
thus, there was nothing about the defendant of the conduct that suggested that his actions were
innocent or accidental. Id. at 537-40.
In United States v. Pitner, 979 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 873 (1994), a business

which engaged in residential mortgages received $200,000 in cash from an investor who requested
that the transaction remain confidential. The defendant was aware of the CTR filing requirement.
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example, in United States v. Shirk,55 the defendant was charged with
a criminal violation of Section 5324 based on his making of numerous
cash deposits all below the $10,000 threshold. At trial, the government
introduced evidence that the defendant had made more than forty deposits
exceeding $10,000 during a fifteen month period and that he was
exempted from the CTR filing requirements, but that no deposits
exceeding $10,000 during the twelve months after his exemption was
revoked.56 The defendant was convicted of structuring. On appeal the
defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him
because the government failed to prove that he knew that structuring was
a crime. The Third Circuit rejected the defendant's contention. The
court recognized that the majority of the circuit courts had already
concluded that "a conviction for structuring does not require proof that
the defendant knew his or her conduct was illegal."57 The court next

As a consequence, a scheme was devised whereby the money was broken down into amounts less
than $10,000 and deposited into employees' personal accounts. The defendant assisted in avoiding
the CTR requirement by making three cash deposits in amounts less than $10,000 and totaling
$18,000 into his personal account and then returning the money back by check to his codefendant.
Pitner, 979 F.2d at 158. The defendants were convicted of violating Section 5324 and 5322. On
appeal, they contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove a violation of the reporting
requirement because the government failed to prove that they knew that avoiding the filing
requirement was a crime. Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected the contention and held that the government
was not required to prove that they knew their conduct was a crime. Id. at 159. The court reasoned
that: "The person acting only needs to know what he is doing ....A person, therefore, only has
to intend to structure deposits for the purpose of frustrating the CTR requirement to satisfy the
willfulness element." Id. The court went on to reject any reliance on any analogy between the need
to prove knowledge of a crime in tax cases and the requirements of the currency reporting
requirements. Id. at 160. The court explained that "It]he laws governing currency reporting are
straightforward and easily understood in contrast to the complex and sometimes convoluted tax laws."
Id. at 161.
In United States v. Brown, 954 F.2d 1563 (1lth Cir.), certdenied, 113 S.Ct. 284 (1993), the
Eleventh Circuit followed the Second Circuit's decision in Scanio and the Ninth Circuit's decision
in United States v. Hoyland, 914 F.2d 1125, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1990) and held that the prosecution
was not required to prove that the defendant knew that structuring was a crime. The court found that
the government need only prove that the defendant was aware of the reporting requirement and
intended to evade those requirements through structuring. Brown, 954 F.2d at 1568.
In United States v. Rogers, 962 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1992), the defendant structured the purchase
of eighteen cashier's checks in an amount less than $10,000. The defendant admitted that he did this
in order to evade the filing of a CTRI The defendant was convicted of structuring and appealed.
On appeal, he contended that the government was required to prove that he knew that structuring was
illegal. Relying on the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in Brown and the decision of the Tenth
Circuit in Dashney, the Fourth Circuit held that the prosecution was not required to prove that the
defendant knew that structuring was illegal. The court found "no basis" to conclude that Congress
intended to require proof that the defendant knew his actions were illegal. Brown, 962 F.2d at 34445.
55. 981 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir.), vacated, 114 S.Ct. 873 (1994).
56. Id. at 1389-92.
57. Id. at 1390.
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held that a "willful" violation meant that the person acted deliberately.
The court viewed the conduct proscribed by Section 5324 as not the kind
of activity that an ordinary person would engage in innocently because
the conduct in question specifically involved a purposeful act to prevent
a financial institution from providing the government with the
information to scrutinize the transaction. 8 Finally, the court interpreted
the legislative history as not indicating any intent to require knowledge
of illegality as an element of the offense.59
D. The First Circuit'sMinority Opinion
The only court at variance with Scanio is the First Circuit's en banc
consideration of a consolidated case involving two separate Section 5324
prosecutions in two different cases. In United States v. Aversa,6 ° the
court held that the government was required to prove that the defendants
knew that violating the reporting requirement or antistructuring provision
was a crime. In the alternative, the court held that the government could
prove that the defendants acted in "reckless disregard" of knowing that
their conduct was a crime. In the first case which was consolidated on
appeal, the defendant, while working as an officer for a bank, made five
cash deposits for a friend. All of the deposits were in excess of $10,000
and totaled $237,000.61
Although the defendant was the bank's
compliance officer and responsible for filing CTRs on its behalf, he
bypassed depositing the money with a teller and did not file any CTRs
in connection with the deposit.62 At trial, the defendant admitted that
he was aware of the bank's filing requirement, but argued that he acted
under the belief that the deposits fell within the scope of one of the
reporting exceptions. The defendant was convicted of violating Section
5322 based on his failure to file CTRs under Sections 5313.63
In the second case, two defendants were convicted of violating
Section 5322 based on their structuring the deposit of profits from the
sale of a parcel of land in order to conceal the profits from the
defendant's estranged wife.'
At trial, both defendants admitted that
they knew the bank was required to file a CTR, but argued that they were
unaware that structuring was a crime. The defendant's mistake of the law

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1390-91.
Id. at 1391.
984 F.2d 493 (lst Cir. 1993), vacated, Donovan v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 873 (1994).
Aversa, 984 F.2d at 494.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 495.
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theory was rejected by the district court and the defendant's were
convicted.65
On appeal the cases were consolidated and an en banc panel was
convened. On appeal, the defendants argued that Section 5322's
willfulness requirement meant that the government was required to prove
'
that the defendants "intended to commit a crime."66
As the court
summarized, the defendants asserted a "subjected standard of intent and
asseverate[d] that mistake of law necessarily constitutes a complete
defense."6 7 In considering the challenge, the First Circuit undertook a
detailed analysis of the following four possible definitions of § 5322's
willfulness requirement: (1) that the defendants were aware of their
conduct and the nature of their circumstances; (2) that the defendants
acted with the knowledge that their conduct was a crime; (3) that the
defendants needed to only have known that their conduct was a crime for
some of the reporting provisions, but not for others; and (4) that the
defendants acted with the knowledge that structuring was a crime or in
reckless disregard or deliberate blindness to the fact that their conduct
was a crime.6s
The court rejected the first view on the grounds that this theory
undervalued the statute's language by reading willfulness as if it were
simply a synonym for general intent.69 The court rejected the second
view on the basis that this theory would allow all mistakes of law to
serve as a defense and would vitiate the general principle that "deliberate
ignorance" is not an excuse. 70 The court rejected the third view on the
ground that it would cause differing definitions to attach to a single usage
of an operative term in a single statutory section. 7' The court then
adopted the final theory on the ground that it would negate any mistake
of law defense when the mistake in question resulted from intentional or
reckless disregard of a legal duty.72 Consequently, the court held that
Section 5322 requires the government to prove either that the defendants

65. Id.
66. Aversa, 984 F.2d at 496.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 497.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Aversa, 984 F.2d at 497-98. The court explained that: "Ascribing various meanings to a
single iteration of a single word-reading the word differently for each code section would open
Pandora's jar [sic]. If courts can render meaning so malleable, the usefulness of a single penalty
provision for a group of related code section will be eviscerated and, by extension, almost any code
section that references a group of other code sections would become susceptible to individuated
interpretation." Aversa, 984 F.2d at 498.
72. Id.
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knew that evading the reporting requirement was a crime or that they
acted in reckless disregard.7"
The court then affirmed the first
defendant's conviction on the ground that the district court's jury
instruction adequately explained every legitimate theory upon which the
defendant's theory could rest.74 The other defendant's structuring
conviction, however, was reversed on the ground that they were not
afforded the opportunity to present the mistake of law defense.75
IV. The United States Supreme Court's Opinion
A. Majority
The Supreme Court was not persuaded by the weight of the authority
and reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ratzlaf76 The 5-4 decision
was written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and joined by a curious
combination of Justices Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens, Anthony M.
Kennedy, and David H. Souter.77 The Court held that the government
was required to prove that the defendant knew that structuring his
transactions was a crime.7" The Supreme Court based its decision on
two principles, uniformity and fundamental fairness.
The first premise of the Court's decision was based on principles of
uniformity. The Court cited lower court decisions that had defined the
elements of the reporting provision offenses and read these cases as
requiring proof that a defendant knew that evading the reporting
requirement was a crime.79 The Court then held that because Section
73. Id. In a concurring opinion, then Chief Judge Steven Breyer wrote that proof that a
defendant knew that his conduct was a crime was necessary to avoid the "unfair result of criminally
prosecuting individuals who subjectively and honesty believe they have not acted criminally." Id.
at 502. Chief Judge Breyer found that the court's standard was "sufficiently close to [a] purely
subjective standard... that it will avoid using the criminal law, in this technical area, to punish those
with an innocent state of mind, those who did not know they were violating the law and who
reasonably failed to investigate the issue." Id. at 503.
74. Id. at 501.
75. Id.
76. Ratzlaf 114 S. Ct. at 663.
77. The day after the Court rendered its decision, Linda
Greenhouse reported that, considering Justice Blackmun's extensive dissenting opinion, the majority
was most likely the result of a last minute switch in votes: "It is possible that the Chief Justice
initially assigned Justice Blackmun to write a majority opinion upholding the conviction after the case
was argued ... but another member of the initial majority later switched sides joining a dissenting
opinion by Justice Ginsburg and converting it into a majority opinion." Linda Greenhouse,Ignorance
of the Law Can Be an Excuse, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1994, at A17.
78. Ratzlaf 114 S. Ct. at 663.
79. See United States v. Struman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1476-77 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
section 5314 conviction requires proof that defendant knew of and intended to evade reporting
provision); Ratzlaf 114 S. Ct. at 659-60, citing United States v. Bank of New England, N.A. 821
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5322 was the criminal enforcement provision for all Title 31 offenses,
Section 5322 should be read the same way each time it is enlisted."0
The Court reasoned that it would be wrong to apply the criminal penalty
provision differently in connection with prosecutions based on a Section
5324 violation than for a Section 5313, 5314 or 5316 offense."
The second ground of the Court's decision was driven by principles
of fundamental fairness. The government had argued that structuring was
not the kind of activity which an ordinary person would typically engage
in innocently. Therefore, it was "reasonable" to sustain convictions based
on proof that a defendant knew of the reporting requirement and intended
to evade it without proving that a defendant knew that evading the
reporting requirement was a crime. 2 Justice Ginsberg grafted herself
to the notion that to hold otherwise might result in the prosecution of
otherwise innocent conduct based on a "complex" and obscure federal
statute. 83 The Court explained that proof that the defendant knew that
it was a crime to evade the reporting requirement was warranted because
structuring was not inherently "evil." 84 The Court then drew a curious
distinction between evading the reporting requirement for legitimate
reasons and for illegitimate purposes and implicitly rejected the theory
that evading the reporting requirement for any reason was a crime.85
The Court acknowledged that there were "undoubtably" individuals who
attempt to elude federal reporting requirements for the purpose of
furthering their criminal activity, such as laundering drug proceeds. 6
On the other hand, the Court recognized that an individual may just as

F.2d 844, 845-59 (1stCir. 1987) (holding that a section 5313 conviction requires proof that defendant
intended to evade reporting provision); United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1543 (1 th Cir.
1984) (holding that a conviction for willful violation of section 5313 requires proof that defendant
knew of reporting provision and intended to evade it); United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887, 890
(5th Cir. 1980) (holding that conviction for violating former section 5316 requires proof that
defendant knew of reporting provision); United States v. Dichne, 612 F.2d 632, 636 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that conviction for willful violation of former Section 5316 requires proof that defendant
was aware of the reporting requirement intended to evade reporting provision); United States v.
Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that conviction for willful violation of Section
5316 requires proof that defendant knew of the reporting requirement and intended to evade it).
80. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 660. Unfortunately, the reasoning is anemic because none of the
reporting provision cases cited by the Court held that the government must prove that the defendant
knew that evading the reporting requirement was a crime.
8 1. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 660.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 659-61.
84. Id. at 661. However, in contrast to the federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C § 1956,
there is nothing in the language of Section 5322 that requires that the funds structured be criminal
proceeds or derived from some unlawful activity.
85. Id.at 661.
86. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 660.
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likely be evading the law to avoid any notice by the government of his
cash transactions for reasons other than an intent to commit a crime. The
Court cited an individual's possible desire to reduce the risk of an IRS
audit. In addition, the Court found that an individual may be breaking
down his cash deposits merely as a precaution against being robbed on
his way to the bank and not in connection with a criminal scheme.87
The Court explained that "[i]n light of these examples, we are
unpersuaded by the argument that structuring is so obviously 'evil' or
inherently 'bad' that the 'willfulness' requirement is satisfied irrespective
' 8
of the defendant's knowledge of the illegality of structuring.
The Court then addressed the government's argument that the
statute's legislative history did not indicate any requirement that the
prosecution prove that a defendant knew it was a crime to evade the
reporting requirement.89 The Court rejected the government's argument
and found a contrary intention expressed in Section 5322's use of the
words "willfully violate." The Court found that by the use of this term,
Congress signaled its intent to add an additional level of proof. Thus, in
addition to the elements in the reporting provision that require proof that
a defendant knew of the reporting requirement and intended to evade it,

87. Id. However well intended, the Court's reasoning is not a panacea. Under the Court's own
safeguards, it is possible for an "innocent" person, as defined by Justice Ginsburg to be subject to
prosecution under Section 5322. For example, an individual who knows of the reporting requirement
and knows that it is a crime to evade the reporting requirement structures his cash deposits for the
purpose of reducing an audit by the IRS, would be subject to prosecution under the Court's own
formulation despite his "innocence."
88. Id. at 662. The Court explained that had Congress wished to dispense with any
"willfulness" requirement "it could have furnished the appropriate instruction." Id. The Court noted
that Congress made this distinction in the civil forfeiture context under 18 U.S.C. § 981. According
to the Court, under Section 981, the government need not prove that a defendant knew that he was
committing a crime in order to seize and forfeit any property involved in a transaction in violation
of section 5313 or 5324. Ratzlaf 114 S. Ct. 662 n.16. This shows remarkable confidence that
Congress considered Section 981 when drafting Section 5322 and was deliberate in crafting a
distinction. Section 981 is a civil forfeiture provision tied directly to "violations" of criminal
offenses in Title 18 and Title 31. The Court implies that because a forfeiture will be sustained based
on a "violation" as opposed to a "willful violation," in order to sustain a civil forfeiture under Section
981, the elements of the "crime" in the forfeiture context are different than the elements of the
"crime" in a criminal context. Thus, although it is necessary to prove that what was seized consisted
of criminal proceeds generated from the commission of a crime, the government would need only
to prove that the defendant acted with knowledge of the reporting requirement and intended to evade
the law but not that he knew that this conduct was a crime. Therefore, it would not be incumbent
upon the government to prove all three elements of the violation because under the Court's
formulation, a "violation" under the civil forfeiture statute is different than a "willful violation" under
Section 5322. Although the burden of proof to prove a civil forfeiture (preponderance of the
evidence) is less than the burden of proof to sustain a conviction (beyond a reasonable doubt), this
is the first time the Court has found that the elements of the crime and forfeiture are different.
89. Ratzlaf 114 S.Ct. at 662-63.
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Section 5322 adds a third element requiring proof that the defendant
knew that evading the reporting requirement was a crime. 9
B. Dissenting Opinion
In a compelling dissent written by Justice Harry Blackmun, which
was joined by a curious combination of Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas, Justice
Blackmun voiced a strong criticism of the majority opinion. The dissent
rejected the view that the burden of proof to sustain a criminal violation
of the reporting statute should be viewed differently because the law was
some sort of arbitrary and obscure regulatory provision. Thus, the
requirement that the prosecution prove a willful violation should be read
like every other criminal statute. The dissent felt that the majority's
distinction was artificial and its holding that the government prove the
defendant knew that his conduct was a crime was contrary to the
fundamental tenet of criminal law that knowledge of illegality is not
required to sustain a criminal conviction. 9 The dissent found that a
willful violation requires knowledge of the bank's reporting requirement
and an intent to evade it, and nothing more.92
The dissonance throughout the dissenting opinion stemmed from a
fundamental disagreement with the majority's view that the use of the
term "willful violation" in the context of the reporting provisions imposed
a unique burden on the prosecution to prove that a defendant knew his
conduct was a crime. Relying on the venerable proposition that
ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal
prosecution, the dissent asserted that the term willful violation in criminal
law generally means acting knowingly and intentionally, and not with the
knowledge that the act is a crime.93 Justice Blackmun found nothing in
the interpretation of the law by the circuit courts or the statutory language
to support the conclusion that the provision required proof beyond
showing that the defendant acted knowingly and was conscious of his
actions.94
The dissent found that the majority opinion simply confused the
concept of proving knowledge of the reporting requirements with
knowledge of illegality. Under the cases which interpreted the statute, as
well as the fundamental principles of criminal law, it is one's knowledge

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 665.
Id.
Id. at 664.
Ratzlaf 114 S. Ct. at 664.
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of the reporting requirements, not "knowledge of the illegality of one's
'
conduct," that makes a violation "willful."95
Justice Blackmun wrote at
length that the majority's reliance on precedent to support the view that
knowledge of criminality had been clearly established by the lower courts
was erroneous. The dissent rejected the majority's statement that Section
5322 had been applied to Section 5314 and 5316 prosecutions to add an
element to the crime which requires proof that the defendant knew that
evading the reporting requirement was a crime.96 The dissent read these
cases as standing for a more subtle proposition that a willful violation
requires only knowledge of the pertinent reporting requirement and intent
to evade compliance, but not the knowledge of criminality.9 7 As a
result, proof that a defendant willfully violated the reporting provision is
no different than requiring proof that he acted knowingly and means that
a defendant acted with knowledge of the reporting requirement and had
the intent to evade the financial law.98
The dissent also rejected the majority's reliance on notions of
fairness. Justice Ginsburg found that without proof that a defendant knew
that evading the reporting requirement was a crime, there exists the
possibility that a criminal conviction will rest on innocent conduct. 99
On the other hand, the dissent looked at the particular conduct giving rise
to a criminal prosecution and found that the danger of an individual being
convicted of violating the straightforward reporting statutes based on
otherwise innocent conduct was remote. The reporting requirements
demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the purpose of the conduct
was to evade the reporting requirements. According to Justice Blackmun,
it is this requirement which shields innocent conduct from
prosecution.' 00 Justice Blackmun explained that:
It is true that the Court, on occasion, has imposed a knowledge-ofillegality requirement upon criminal statutes to ensure that the
defendant acted with a wrongful purpose. I cannot agree, however,
that the imposition of such a requirement is necessary here. First, the
conduct at issue-splitting up transactions involving tens of thousands
of dollars in cash for the specific purpose of circumventing a bank's
reporting duty-is hardly .. .innocuous activity ... Further, an
individual convicted of structuring is, by definition, aware that cash
transactions are regulated, and he cannot seriously argue that he

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 665.
Id.
Ratzlaf, 114 S.Ct. at 666.
Id. at 661.

100. Id.
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lacked notice of the law's intrusion into the particular sphere of
activity. By requiring knowledge of a bank's reporting requirements
as well as a "purpose of evading" those requirements, the
antistructuring provision targets those who knowingly act to deprive
the Government of information to which it is entitled. In my view,
that is not so plainly innocent a purpose as to justify reading into the
statute the additional element of knowledge of illegality.'
The dissent concluded its opinion by reviewing the legislative history
of the statute and found nothing to suggest that Congress intended proof
of knowledge of illegality to be read into the statute as an element of the
offense based on the terms "willful violation."' 0 2 The dissent read the
legislative history in conjunction with the development of parallel case
law as rejecting any requirement that the prosecution prove knowledge of
illegality. Because the legislative history did not specifically reject the
existing body of law on the issue, the dissent found that Congress must
have intended to preserve and adopt the case law." 3 Thus, according
to all indications in the legislation, defendants' willful violations were
established if they knew about the reporting requirements and purposely
sought to evade the law by breaking down their transactions into multiple
transactions under $10,000. Accordingly, the dissent found ample
confirmation that Congress did not contemplate a departure from the
general rule that a criminal violation, whether termed "willful,"
"knowingly" or "purposeful" does not require proof that the defendants
knew that their conduct were crimes.
VII. Discussion
A. Proof That Goes Beyond Facts That Make The Conduct A Crime
An act is done "willfully" and "knowingly" if it is done voluntarily
and intentionally.'0 4 The Supreme Court's decision means that in the
context of the reporting provisions "willful violations" are different from
"knowing violations." According to the Court, these crimes are unique
offenses that require proof that the defendants knew that their conduct
were crimes.
To sustain a conviction under Section 5322, the
government is now required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendants knew the law. Distinguishing between a "willful violation"
and a "knowing violation" of the law is not called for under the statutory

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Ratzlaf 114S. Ct. at668.
Id. at 669.
United States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d 306, 316-17 (4th Cir. 1991).
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scheme at issue. This strict burden of proof is not needed to limit the
scope of the conduct which is made criminal by the statute. The
reporting provisions are aimed at conduct which is intended to deprive
the government of information about domestic cash and international
monetary transactions. Criminal convictions under this federal law should
be sustained based on proof that the reporting provisions are knowingly
and intentionally breached. There is no reason for deeming the conduct
"innocent" if the government can establish that the defendant knew of the
law regarding the reporting obligation and intended to evade the law.' °5
Rejecting Ratzlaf's contention that the government was required to prove
knowledge that the conduct was a crime would not have been tantamount
to imposing a rigorous form of strict criminal liability or clearing the path
toward convicting persons whose conduct would not alert them to the
criminality of their conduct. The government would still have been
required to prove that a defendant intentionally breached a known legal
obligation. Therefore, the violation would have been willful. The
Supreme Court has decided that this is not enough. Although it may be
criminal, absent proof that the defendant knew that the conduct was a
crime, the charge will not be sustained.
The organizing principle cited by the Court for adding an element
of proof to the crime is based on speculation that this particular law is
overbroad and, thus, notions of fairness have compelled the Court to limit
the scope of the statute.'
However, this concern is illusory in the
context of the conduct made criminal under the reporting provision.
Section 5322 does not criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent
conduct. Conduct intended to evade the federal law, unlike, for example,
owning a firearm, is quotidian. Unlike the tradition of widespread lawful
gun ownership by private individuals, such a tradition does not apply to
evading the reporting requirements. Thus, the conduct made criminal
under the law is not entirely in and of itself innocent. As a consequence,
there is no particular need to afford fair warning that ordinary conduct is
a crime. Furthermore, proof that the defendant intended to evade a
known federal law substantially dilutes any concern that "innocent
conduct" will be'the subject of a federal criminal prosecution."7 In

105. If Congress intended a more stringent proof requirement it could have required the
prosecution to prove that the money structured was criminal proceeds.
106. The possibility that the government may enforce the law against an innocent person is not
generally acknowledged as significant unless the possibility ripens into a prosecution. See Poster 'N'
Things, Ltd v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1747, 1755 (1994).
107. The Court apparently discounts the judgment of prosecutors and believes that a strict burden
of proof is necessary so as to deter injustice and to ensure that shop owners who breakdown their
cash deposits so as to avoid being robbed on the way to the bank or husbands hiding their money
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sum, there is nothing inherent in the scope of the conduct which is made
criminal under the statute that justifies the Court's reading a stricter
knowledge requirement into the legislation." 8
In essence, Justice Ginsburg has placed limits on prosecutions which
may arise under the reporting provisions because of what appears to be

from their estranged wives are not charged. This lack of confidence may be well deserved. See Dirk
Johnson, A Farmer 70, Saw No Choice, Nor Did the Sentencing Judge, N.Y. TIMEs, July 20, 1994,
at A I (reporting that a farmer, wife, and son federally prosecuted and convicted of perjury based on
a lie in federal bankruptcy court about selling livestock to raise money to feed starving hogs).
108. Moreover, the Court's principle motivation for imposing the heightened scienter
requirement, to prevent innocent people from being prosecuted for conduct that they did not realize
was a crime, has been traditionally rejected by the Court in interpreting criminal statutes. The
Supreme Court has permitted punishment in the absence of conscious wrong doing so long as the
defendant was not powerless to prevent or commit the violation. See Park v. United States, 421 U.S.
658, 95 S. Ct. 1903, 1912 (1975) (holding a corporate officer strictly liable under the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act). Park was recently cited with approval in Austin v. United States 113 S. Ct.
2801, 2810 n.1 1 (1993); United States v, Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 42 S. Ct. 301 (1922) (holding a seller
of cocaine guilty although he did not know that it was a crime to sell cocaine).
Of particular interest in the Ratzlaf case is the contrast between two profoundly different
readings of lower court decisions that defined the requisite criminal intent. To support the
proposition that the prosecution must prove knowledge for the defendant's conduct to be a crime,
Justice Ginsburg reads these cases as holding that one must show the defendant violated a "known
legal duty." Justice Blackmun writes in his dissent that these cases stand for a less expansive
proposition. According to the dissent, these lower court cases mean that the government is required
to prove that a defendant acted with knowledge of the reporting requirement and intended to evade
the law. The majority opinion is demonstrative of a failure by an appellate court to accurately distill
the proposition of law from the factual context of the lower court holdings.
The lower court decisions that are cited by Justice Ginsburg emphasize that the government
is required to prove knowledge of the reporting requirement and intent to evade the law. It is
doubtful that these decisions stand for the proposition that the government is required to prove that
the defendant knew that evading the reporting requirement was a crime because these cases involved
claims that the defendant was either unaware of the reporting requirement itself or that he did not
intend to evade any obligation under the federal law. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 659. Dichne, 612 F.2d
at 636 (explaining that the defendant claimed to be unaware of the reporting requirement); Granda,
565 F.2d at 924 (discussing that a defendant claimed to be unaware of the reporting requirement);
Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d at 854-55 (holding that a finding of willfulness under Section
5322 must be supported by evidence of defendant's knowledge of reporting requirement and intent
to evade); Eisenstein, 731 F.2d at 1543 (discussing that a defense of good-faith reliance on advice
of counsel); Struman, 951 F.2d at 1476 (defendant claimed to have no knowledge of reporting
requirement); Warren, 612 F.2d at 890-91 (holding that the defendant's conviction was reversed
based on failure of the government to prove that defendant knew of reporting requirement). In
Ratzlaf the defendant admitted that he structured the cash transactions and that he did so with the
knowledge of and the intent to avoid the reporting requirement. None of the cases cited by Justice
Ginsburg involve an issue as to whether the government was required to prove that the defendant
knew that evading the reporting requirement was a crime. Thus, reliance on these cases to support
the proposition that the government is required to prove that not only did a defendant know of the
reporting requirement and intended to evade it, but also that he knew that evading the statute was
a crime, is not well founded. Thus, when read in the context of the precise contentions that were
raised, any reliance on the finding that the government was required to prove "specific intent to
commit the crime" means the intent to evade a known reporting requirement and not with the specific
knowledge that evading the reporting requirement is a crime.

CRIMINAL CONDUCT UNDER RA7ZLAF

a void for vagueness theory. The void for vagueness doctrine requires a
penal statute to define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness so
that the public is aware of what conduct is prohibited and in a manner
that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 9
To withstand a challenge under this doctrine, the criminal statute must set
forth relatively clear guidelines as to prohibited conduct. Requiring the
prosecution to prove that the defendant was aware of the reporting
provision and intended to evade the law ensures that an ordinary person
is able to recognize which conduct in question is criminal. The two
prong burden of proof also serves to minimize the possibility of arbitrary
enforcement and assists in defining the sphere of prohibited conduct
under the statute.
Finally, the reporting provisions set forth exemptions for certain
businesses that act to further limit the scope of the statute and, thus,
precludes its enforcement against legitimate conduct."
Moreover,
vagueness challenges are reviewed in light of the facts of the particular
case."' Ratzlaf was directly informed of the reporting obligations on
two separate occasions."' He then undertook an elaborate scheme to
evade this law." 3 There is no obvious danger of arbitrary enforcement
presented by the facts of the case. Therefore, the elements of the crime
under the majority of pre-Ratzlaf court of appeals decisions should have
withstood scrutiny under the void for vagueness doctrine.
The difficulty with the majority opinion is further evident when the
Ratzlafdecision is compared to the Court's reasoning in Staples v. United
States."4' In Staples, which was decided by a plurality of the Justices
four months after Ratzlaf, the defendant was convicted of possessing an
unregistered machine gun in violation of Title 26 of the United States
Code Section 5861. On appeal, the defendant argued that the government
was required to prove that he knew that the weapon he possessed was a
machine gun, meaning capable of firing more than one round of
ammunition with a single pull of the trigger, as opposed to simply a
firearm." 5 The defendant claimed that he was unaware that the weapon
he possessed was a machine gun. 1 6 The Court reversed the conviction

109. Posters 'N' Things, 114 S. Ct. at 1754 (rejecting challenge to narcotics statute); Mclamb,
985 F.2d 1291-92 (rejecting challenge to money laundering statute).
110.
111. Mclamb, 985 F.2d at 1290.
112. Ratzlaf 114 S. Ct. at 663.
113. Id.
114. 114 S.Ct. 1793 (1994).
115. Id. at 1795-96.
116. Id. at 1796.
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and held that the statute required the prosecution to prove that the
defendant
knew that he possessed not simply a weapon, but a machine
7
gun.1

This decision is not inconsistent with the position taken by the Court
in Ratzlaf. However, the reasoning, which was stated by Justice Thomas'
majority opinion in Staples and Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion,
was unexpected. Justice Thomas explained that the government must
prove the facts that make his conduct illegal."' 1 The Court rejected any
notion that the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew his
conduct was a crime. The Court found that proof that the defendant
knew that he possessed a machine gun should be adequate to put him on
notice that his conduct may be regulated." '9 If this reasoning were
applied to Ratzlaf, it would produce a different result. In Ratzlaf,proving
the facts that make the defendant's conduct a crime would mean proving
that the defendant knew about the reporting requirement and intended to
evade this federal law. Moreover, proving that the defendant knew of the
federal law and that he intended to evade the law should have been found
to be adequate to put him on notice that his conduct was a crime.
Similar to possessing a machine gun, one would hardly be surprised to
learn that evading the federal reporting statute is not an innocent act.
Thus, proof that the defendant knew of the reporting requirement and
intended to evade the law should be sufficient to show that the defendant
knew that his conduct was a crime and thus, deprived the act of any
apparent innocence.
Even more remarkable is the comparison between Justice Ginsburg's
majority opinion in Ratzlafand her concurring opinion in Staples. Again,
relying on the notion that the proof was necessary to shield people against
punishment for apparently innocent activity, Justice Ginsburg found that
the government was required to prove that the defendant knew that what
he possessed was a machine gun. 20 However, contrary to the entire
premise of Justice Ginsburg's decision in Ratzlaf, she rejected the notion
that the government was required to prove that the defendant in effect
knew of the law. 2 ' Justice Ginsburg explained that "[t]he mens rea
requirement requires knowledge only of the facts that make the
defendant's conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related presumption
'deeply rooted in the American legal system,' that ordinarily, 'ignorance

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1802.
Landsgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1497 (1994).
Id. at 1800-04.
Id. at 1805-06.
Id. at 1805.
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of the law or mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution' ...
criminal law does not require knowledge that an act is illegal, wrong or
blameworthy.' ' 22 Had Justice Ginsburg held to this thought four
months earlier, Ratzlafwould not have been decided in the way which it
was and, in Justice Blackmun's words, Ratzlaf would not have been
123
"laughing all the way to the bank.'
B. CircumstantialEvidence And Willful Blindness Instruction
The Court's decision imposes an additional burden on criminal
prosecutions under the federal reporting statute. 24 This strict burden
of proof is sure to deter reporting requirement charges. The extent of any
arrest may be mitigated to some degree by the following two factors:
first, by the Court's own recognition that circumstantial evidence may be
used to prove each element of the offense, including that the defendant
knew that evading the reporting requirement was a crime,' 25 and
second, by the use of the willful blindness or "ostrich" instruction. If the
evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignorance, the government
is entitled to an instruction that a person cannot avoid knowledge of
illegality of a crime by consciously avoiding the truth about particular
conduct. 126

122. Id. at 1805 n.3.
123. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens implies that had the Court applied the reasoning
in Staples to Ratzlaf the defendant's conviction would have been sustained. "[A] defendant may
know that he possesses a weapon with all the characteristics that make it a "firearm" within the
meaning of the statute and also know that it has never been registered, but be ignorant of the federal
registration requirement. In such a case, we presume knowledge of the law even if we know the
defendant is "innocent" in the sense that Justice Ginsburg uses the word." Staples, 114 S.Ct. at
1814.
124. See United States v. Rogers, 18 F.3d 265, 267 (4th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Retos,
25 F.3d 1220, 1230 (3d Cir. 1994) (reversing convictions for failure to comply with Ratzla).
125. Ratzlaf 114 S.Ct. at 663 n.19. The use of circumstantial evidence was also approved by
the Court in Staples to show that the defendant knew he possessed a machine gun. Staples, 114 S.
Ct. at 1802 n.l. See also United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1205 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding
circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain money laundering conviction).
126. See United States v. Walker, 25 F.3d 540, 545-46 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that in a money
laundering and structuring trial the government is entitled to ostrich instruction where evidence
supports inference that defendant had consciously avoided knowledge about the source of money and
illegal nature of structuring). See also United States v. Whittington, 26 F.3d 465, 463 (4th Cir. 1994)
(holding that a deliberate avoidance instruction is proper if there is a foundation in the evidence to
support a finding of deliberate avoidance and the record need not contain direct evidence that a
defendant deliberately avoided knowledge of wrongdoing, and all that is necessary is evidence from
which the jury could infer deliberate avoidance of knowledge). On September 21, 1994, The Wall
Street Journal reported that federal investigators were looking into possible money laundering by
several brokerage firms. More particularly, the article stated that "at issue is whether the brokerage
firms showed what courts call 'willful blindness' in dealing with illegal drug profits." Alexandra
Peers, Brokers ProbedIn Laundering Of Drug Money, WALL ST. J.,Sept. 21, 1994, at A3.
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C. Investigation Tool
Fortunately, the primary utility of the reporting statute, which is to
create a paper trail that will betray criminal conduct, has not been diluted.
The reporting requirements will continue to be an effective investigative
tool. For example, on June 19, 1994, The New York Times reported that
an employee at the Bureau of Engraving and Printing had been charged
with stealing $1.7 million in test currency. 17 The Internal Revenue
Service had been alerted to the defendant by a bank as a result of the
suspect's numerous cash deposits, all of which were under $10,000.28
D. Money Laundering
The Court's decision should not alter the burden of proof in a money
laundering prosecution that is founded on the intent to evade a federal
reporting requirement. The federal money laundering statute is set forth
in Title 18 of the United States Code Section 1956.129 This section is
divided into three main provisions or subparagraphs. Generally, these
provisions prohibit the knowing involvement in a financial transaction or
transfer involving criminally derived proceeds.'
The government must
prove that the transaction or transfer was intended to fulfill one of the
specific intent provisions stated in the statute. One of the specific intent
provisions relates to evading a transaction reporting requirement under
state or federal law.13 1 Because the statute calls for direct proof of
criminal intent, that the defendant engaged in a transaction knowing that
the funds were criminal proceeds, the money laundering statute is not
ambiguous with respect to proof of consciousness of wrongdoing. The
elements of the money laundering offense itself supplies the evil intent.
Without proof that the defendant knew that the funds were criminal
proceeds, the prosecution fails.' 3 2 Thus, there is no need to prove

127. Robert D. Hershey,Treasury Says a Worker Took $1.7 Million in New $100 Bills, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 1994, at AI6.
128. See Hershey, supra note 11 5. See also Joseph P. Fried, Officer and Relatives Indicted in
Purchase of House With Cash, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1994, at A33 (reporting that a New York City
Police Officer charged with structuring based on cash purchase of $275,000 house).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988 & 1992 Supp.).
130. See generally United States v. Garcia-Emmanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1473 (10th Cir. 1994)
(reviewing elements of money laundering offense).
131. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)(ii) and (a)(3)(C) (1988 & 1992 Supp.). See Jackson,
983 F.2d at 767 (holding defendant guilty of money laundering based on evasion of federal reporting
requirement).
132. Compare Carr, 25 F.3d 1204 (holding the evidence was sufficient to find that defendant
knew that $186,000 in cash being transported out of country was drug proceeds) with GarciaEmmanuel, 14 F.3d at 1478 (holding that the defendant's money laundering conviction based on his
wiring money from his bank account to a Florida bank account of Columbian national was reversed
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criminal intent in relation to evading a reporting requirement to ensure
that an individual is not prosecuted for otherwise "innocent" conduct. In
addition, the statute requires the prosecution to show that the defendant
had an intent to evade the reporting requirement, not that the defendant
intended to willfully violate this law.'33 As a consequence, a defendant
can be found to have the specific intent to evade a federal reporting
provision and be guilty of a 1956 violation without proof that he also
knew that evading the reporting requirements was a crime."'
VI. Conclusion
The Court's decision makes clear that to sustain a reporting
requirement conviction the prosecution must prove that a defendant knew
that evading the federal statute was a crime. Thus, the government is
now burdened with proving facts that go beyond showing that the
defendant's conduct was illegal. The Court has inexplicably chosen to
state a remarkable departure in the area of criminal law in a case where
neither the facts of the case, the applicable statute, nor the lower court
decisions compelled such a departure. The extent to which the decision
will act to throttle prosecutions may be mitigated by the Court's
recognition that circumstantial evidence may be used to prove each
element of the offense, including that the defendant knew that evading
the reporting requirement was a crime. Moreover, the primary purpose
of the reporting requirements, to betray criminal conduct, has not been
diluted by the Court's strict knowledge requirement. The reporting
requirements remain an effective investigative resource. The Court's
decision must also be discussed in the context of the federal money
laundering statute. Finally, although an intent to avoid the reporting
requirements is incorporated and designated in the specific intent

where there was no evidence of statements by the defendant probative of intent to commit offense,
unusual secrecy or irregular features surrounding the transaction, depositing drug proceeds in bank
account of legitimate business, using third parties to conceal nature source and ownership of the
funds, a series of unusual financial moves culminating in the transaction or expert testimony on
typical money laundering practices).
133. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1994 Supp.).
134. See United States v. Santos, 20 F.2d 280, 283-84 n.2, 3 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that
because money laundering statute sets forth specific and detailed requirements Ratzlafs willfulness
requirement inapplicable to defendant's money laundering conviction).
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provisions of the federal money laundering statute, the Court's decision
135
does not appear to alter the government's burden of proof.

135. Author's Note: Section 411 of the 1994 Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act, Pub. L. 103-325 enacted on September 23, 1994, amended Section 5324 and
overruled Ratzkaf as it applies to structuring prosecutions. 140 Cong. Rec. H6642. Section
411 (a)(3)(1) adds a criminal penalty provision to Section 5324. Accordingly, resort to Section 5322
in structuring prosecutions is no longer necessary. Ratzlaf, however, remains an impediment to
prosecutions based on Section 5313, 5314, 5315 or 5316 charges because prosecutions based on these
sections continue to rely on Section 5322's criminal penalty provision.

